Shell Process Spawned by Java.EXE
Detects shell spawned from Java host process, which could be a sign of exploitation (e.g. log4j exploitation)
Detection logic
selection
ParentImage|endswith: \java.exe
Image|endswith:
- \bash.exe
- \cmd.exe
- \powershell.exe
- \pwsh.exefilter_main_build
ParentImage|contains: build
CommandLine|contains: buildCondition
selection and not 1 of filter_main_*Raw YAML
title: Shell Process Spawned by Java.EXE
id: dff1e1cc-d3fd-47c8-bfc2-aeb878a754c0
related:
- id: 0d34ed8b-1c12-4ff2-828c-16fc860b766d
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects shell spawned from Java host process, which could be a sign of exploitation (e.g. log4j exploitation)
references:
- https://web.archive.org/web/20231230220738/https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/
author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades), Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2021-12-17
modified: 2024-01-18
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith: '\java.exe'
Image|endswith:
- '\bash.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
filter_main_build:
ParentImage|contains: 'build' # excluding CI build agents
CommandLine|contains: 'build' # excluding CI build agents
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate calls to system binaries
- Company specific internal usage
level: mediumFalse positives
- Legitimate calls to system binaries
- Company specific internal usage
References
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