Potential Credential Dumping Activity Via LSASS
Detects process access requests to the LSASS process with specific call trace calls and access masks. This behaviour is expressed by many credential dumping tools such as Mimikatz, NanoDump, Invoke-Mimikatz, Procdump and even the Taskmgr dumping feature.
Detection logic
selection
TargetImage|endswith: \lsass.exe
GrantedAccess|contains:
- "0x1038"
- "0x1438"
- "0x143a"
- "0x1fffff"
CallTrace|contains:
- dbgcore.dll
- dbghelp.dll
- kernel32.dll
- kernelbase.dll
- ntdll.dllfilter_main_system_user
SourceUser|contains:
- AUTHORI
- AUTORIfilter_optional_thor
CallTrace|contains|all:
- :\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent\
- \thor\thor64.exe+
- "|UNKNOWN("
GrantedAccess: "0x103800"filter_optional_sysmon
SourceImage|endswith:
- :\Windows\Sysmon64.exe
- :\Windows\Sysmon64a.exeCondition
selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*Raw YAML
title: Potential Credential Dumping Activity Via LSASS
id: 5ef9853e-4d0e-4a70-846f-a9ca37d876da
status: test
description: |
Detects process access requests to the LSASS process with specific call trace calls and access masks.
This behaviour is expressed by many credential dumping tools such as Mimikatz, NanoDump, Invoke-Mimikatz, Procdump and even the Taskmgr dumping feature.
references:
- https://web.archive.org/web/20230329170326/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-21-procdump-or-taskmgr.html
- https://web.archive.org/web/20230208123920/https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md
- https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping/
author: Samir Bousseaden, Michael Haag
date: 2019-04-03
modified: 2026-06-29
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.s0002
logsource:
category: process_access
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
GrantedAccess|contains:
- '0x1038'
- '0x1438'
- '0x143a'
- '0x1fffff' # Too many false positives
# - '0x01000' # Too many false positives
# - '0x1010' # Too many false positives
# - '0x1400' # Too many false positives
# - '0x1410' # Too many false positives
# - '0x40' # Too many false positives
CallTrace|contains:
- 'dbgcore.dll'
- 'dbghelp.dll'
- 'kernel32.dll'
- 'kernelbase.dll'
- 'ntdll.dll'
filter_main_system_user:
SourceUser|contains: # Covers many language settings
- 'AUTHORI'
- 'AUTORI'
filter_optional_thor:
CallTrace|contains|all:
- ':\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent\'
- '\thor\thor64.exe+'
- '|UNKNOWN('
GrantedAccess: '0x103800'
filter_optional_sysmon:
SourceImage|endswith:
- ':\Windows\Sysmon64.exe'
- ':\Windows\Sysmon64a.exe'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: mediumFalse positives
- Unknown
References
- https://web.archive.org/web/20230329170326/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-21-procdump-or-taskmgr.html
- https://web.archive.org/web/20230208123920/https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md
- https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping/