Wab Execution From Non Default Location
Detects execution of wab.exe (Windows Contacts) and Wabmig.exe (Microsoft Address Book Import Tool) from non default locations as seen with bumblebee activity
Detection logic
selection
Image|endswith:
- \wab.exe
- \wabmig.exefilter
Image|startswith:
- C:\Windows\WinSxS\
- C:\Program Files\Windows Mail\
- C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Mail\Condition
selection and not filterRaw YAML
title: Wab Execution From Non Default Location
id: 395907ee-96e5-4666-af2e-2ca91688e151
status: test
description: Detects execution of wab.exe (Windows Contacts) and Wabmig.exe (Microsoft Address Book Import Tool) from non default locations as seen with bumblebee activity
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/08/08/bumblebee-roasts-its-way-to-domain-admin/
- https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/bumblebee-loader-cybercrime
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/09/26/bumblebee-round-two/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-12
modified: 2022-09-27
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\wab.exe'
- '\wabmig.exe'
filter:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
- 'C:\Program Files\Windows Mail\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Mail\'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: highFalse positives
- Unknown
References
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